The retail gasoline market is going through a process of restructuring and consolidation in many developed economies. During the past decade, a large number of gasoline stations have been closed down. The present paper aims to investigate this process. One of the key characteristics of the retail gasoline market is that competition is localised, and this spatial dimension of competition has to be taken into account when investigating the (binary) decision of whether or not to exit from this business. The results of a probit model estimated on the Austrian retail gasoline sector suggest that the degree of spatial differentiation (distance between gasoline stations) as well as other station-specific and regional characteristics can explain parts of the actual exit behaviour observed between 2003 and 2011.
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Introduction
Economists have long recognised a central tradeoff in spatial location choice: stealing customers by locating closer to competitors comes at the cost of intensified price competition (Marshall, 1920) . While a large volume of theoretical research analyses strategic location decisions, only very few empirical studies explicitly consider the spatial dimension when investigating firms' entry and/or exit decisions (recent examples include Seim, 2006 and Watson, 2005) . The present paper uses a unique panel data set of retail gasoline stations in Austria for the period from 2003 to 2011 to investigate firms' exit decisions econometrically. The geographical location of each gasoline station is linked to information on the Austrian road system, which allows us to take into account the spatial dimension of competition (distance between gasoline stations).
Investigating exits in a spatial context in the retail gasoline market is particularly interesting since competition is highly localised in this market. Outlets compete with close rivals only; this corresponds nicely to theoretical models of spatial competition in industrial organisations. Further, market structure is characterised by a few large companies or retail chains, socalled majors, dominating the market and operating outlets in most local markets. These majors compete with a large number of small firms (independent or unbranded stations) that are only active in a few or even in one local market only. Finally, gasoline is a homogeneous product with respect to its chemical properties and stations differentiate location as well as by providing additional services (shops, opening hours, attendant service etc.), which is explicitly taken into account in the empirical analysis.
The Austrian retail gasoline market has experienced considerable structural changes. According to the annual reports of the Austrian Economic Chamber, the number of gasoline stations decreased from 4,061 in 1988 to 2,575 stations at the end of 2011. This corresponds to a decline of almost 37%.
1 Between 2003 and 2011, 10 .9% of stations were shut down and 29.6% either left the market or changed the brand. The 1 Similar changes have been observed for the US and Canadian gasoline markets (Eckert and West, 2005). aim of this paper is to shed light on structural changes in the Austrian retail gasoline market. In particular, we investigate the competition structure and the characteristics of stations with respect to the exit probability. Note that individual exit decisions are binary in nature (exit yes or no). To investigate discrete exit choices, we apply a probit model on station-level data for the Austrian gasoline market. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in section 2, we describe the data, section 3 reports the empirical results and section 4 concludes.
Data
The empirical analysis utilises three different data sources. (1)
The third data set contains information on the population and size of the municipalities and districts in this region, as a part of the population census collected by the Austrian statistical office in 2001. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for all the metric and dummy variables included in the empirical model. The variable Samebrand indicates how many of the ten nearest neighbours of one station operate under the same brand. Following Götz and Gugler (2006) , we expect a positive effect of this variable on the exit probability since a higher market concentration is argued to lead to more exits. No. of Independents measures how many of the ten nearest neighbours are independent stations. Assuming that independent competitors set prices more aggressively suggests a positive impact of this variable on exit probabilities. Average Distance represents the average distance to the ten nearest neighbours. We expect this variable to lower the exit probability as a greater distance to neighbours reduces the intensity of competition. The variable Dealer Owned equals one if a station is operated by a dealer and zero otherwise.
The probability of exiting the market might also be related to the characteristics of the individual gasoline station. as the reference category is excluded from the estimation.
In addition to these station characteristics, we also consider proxy variables for regional differences in demand: Commuters represents the ratio of incoming plus outgoing commuters to the population at the municipality level and Popdens measures the population density of the municipality level in 1000 inhabitants per km 2 . For both variables, we expect to find a negative impact on the probability of exit. 
Empirical Model and Estimation Results

Let
The distributional assumptions for the error term allow us to state the probabilities of the event as Table 3 thus reduces classification errors from 29.66% to 27.32%, which represents a reduction in the error rate of around 8%.
The estimation model suggests that exits are more likely for gasoline stations in markets with a low degree of spatial differentiation. Specifically, the probability of exit decreases by 0.5 percentage points as the average distance to the ten nearest neighbours Total 837 1985 2822 Notes: Dummy variables for observations missing from the explanatory variables included. The parameter estimates are significantly different from zero at the *** 1%, ** 5% and *, 10% levels. LL() and LL(0) are the log likelihood and restricted log likelihood functions, respectively, and LRT refers to the likelihood ratio test. The pseudo-R 2 is computed as
increases by one minute. The parameter estimate for Average Distance is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. This result is consistent with empirical studies of price setting in the gasoline market: a high density of gasoline stations is found to intensify competition and reduce prices (Pennerstorfer and Weiss, 2013) . Moreover, we find that the number of neighbours selling gasoline under the same brand influences exit rates. As expected, our estimation results suggest that an additional neighbour with the same brand within the local market increases the exit probability of a station by 18.7 percentage points. This effect is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. This finding supports Götz and Gugler (2006) who analyse the incentive of larger retail chains to close outlets as a consequence of a merger. The authors actually find that higher market concentration reduces product variety (as measured by the number of stations per square kilometre). In contrast to Eckert and West (2005) , we do not observe a significant relationship between the number of independent stations within the ten nearest neighbours and the exit probability of retail gasoline stations. Eckert and West (2005) find that a greater local presence of independents increases the exit probability of major brand stations. Moreover, they conclude that this finding is consistent with the independent's hypothesis of rationalisation. Under the independent's hypothesis, firms unilaterally reduce their station number and improve their remaining stations in response to the presence of aggressive, low-cost independent stations. However, our results suggest, compared with the Canadian gasoline market, that the presence of independent stations in the Austrian gasoline market does not increase competition intensity that much. An explanation for this finding could be that the Austrian market is not that competitive in comparison to the Canadian gasoline market, meaning that independent stations do not act that aggressively. Further, our results provide no evidence for a difference between the exit probability of unbranded and branded stations or between dealer-owned and company-owned stations.
The results reported in Table 3 suggest a tendency towards fewer full service stations (and more selfservice stations) as well as more stations with shops. Similar to Carranza et al. (2012) , who examine the effect of a price floor in Quebec on station shutdown, our results also suggest that the presence of an attendant service has a significant positive effect on the probability of exit. We find that stations that also feature shops have a 7 percentage points lower probability of exiting compared with stations without a shop. The estimation model includes four dummy variables characterising the location of the gasoline station on different types of streets (stations located on a highway are the reference category). We find that the probability of the exit of stations located on a highway is significantly lower compared with stations located on all other types of streets. Furthermore, smaller stations are more likely to exit the market than larger ones. Consistent with our expectations, we observe a significant and negative parameter estimate for population density. However, the ratio of commuters does not contribute to the explanatory power of our model.
Conclusion and Extensions
The present paper examines the exit decisions of retail gasoline stations in Austria over the period 2003 to 2011. One of the key characteristics of this market is that competition is localised; only neighbouring stations directly compete for the same customers. This spatial dimension of competition has to be taken into account when investigating the (binary) decision of whether or not to exit from this business. The results of a probit model estimated on the Austrian retail gasoline sector suggest that the degree of spatial differentiation (distance between gasoline stations) as well as other station-specific and regional characteristics can explain parts of the actual exit behaviour observed during this time period. Our results further suggest a tendency towards fewer full service stations (and more self-service stations) as well as more stations with shops.
However, note that the present analysis focuses on one dimension of the process of restructuring and consolidation in the gasoline sector only: exits of individual stations. Other dimensions, such as the entry of new stations or a merger (and rebranding) of existing stations, are ignored. An interesting extension of the present analysis thus would be to model the different dimensions of structural change in the retail gasoline market simultaneously. Secondly, it is plausible to expect some interrelationship between the exit decisions of (neighbouring) stations. If, for example, two stations compete in a local market, the decision of one station to exit might have a positive effect on its rival's probability of survival and vice versa. This finding implies that not only do the characteristics of a particular station influence its probability of survival but so do the characteristics of its neighbours. We hope that future empirical research along these lines might improve our knowledge of firms' entry and exit behaviour in spatially differentiated markets and thus contribute to our understanding of the determinants of local market power.
